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When Equal Is Not the Same "Reverse discrimination," "affirmative action," "preferential hir ing," "preferential admissions"-all of these phrases somehow belong to the 1970s. They predated that decade-"affirmative action," for example, appears in the Civil Rights Act of 1964-but it was then that the terms came into everyday use, as the policies they describe became matters of public concern. The terms are not always inter changeable. "Reverse discrimination" bears a negative connotation that has not yet attached to "affirmative action," which may be one reason why the latter phrase is more common in academic settings. But all of these policies have one thing in common: they favor mem bers of groups that have previously been the objects of prejudice and invidious discrimination. The factor that differentiates these groups from the "majority" is usually race or ethnicity, and, less often, sex.
There is no strong societal agreement that such compensatory dis crimination is ever justified. Even people who generally support it dis pute such matters as what agencies may impose it, under what circum stances, and by what means, just as they dispute whether or not particular groups qualify for such treatment. But there is threshold agreement about what the terms mean and just whom we are discuss ing. That such agreement exists is a revealing fact about American society. Speaking of "reverse" discrimination can be meaningful only when "direct" discrimination has existed, only because "American so ciety is currently a racially conscious society; this is the inevitable and evident consequence of a history of slavery, repression, and preju dice." 1 
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Equality under the Constitution Four Cases in Search of a Rule I have stated that no consensus exists about the legitimacy of these policies, which I shall lump together here as "reverse discrimination." Nor is there agreement about their constitutionality. The Supreme Court is still struggling toward a resolution of these problems. There are some "boundary" cases. A series of federal court decisions have estab lished that racial discrimination is permissible when it is designed to rectify deliberate and documented past discrimination, for instance in public education or employment.2 One decision where the Supreme Court unanimously overturned a policy of reverse discrimination was
McDonald v. Sante Fe Tr ansportation Company, where an employer had discharged two white workers for misappropriating cargo but re tained a black worker who had committed the same offense.3 So we know that one kind of reverse discrimination is permitted and may even be required, that which redresses past racial discrimination, while another kind is forbidden, namely, different punishments for the same act. But the major cases have fallen within these boundaries.
The first two cases, De Funis v. Odegaard and University of Cali fo rnia Regents v. Bakke, had several features in common.4 Each in volved admission to a graduate program in a state university, De Funis to law school and Bakke to medical school. The University of Wa sh ington's law school had established a scheme whereby all applicants were ranked according to a predicted first-year average (PFYA) on the basis of their grades and test scores. In 1971, the year Marco de Funis first applied to the law school, applicants whose PFYA fell below 74.5 points (out of a possible 100) were summarily rejected, unless they were black, Chicano, American Indian, or Filipino. Applicants from these four groups got a special review that gave less weight to the average. As a result, some minority applicants with scores below this cutoff point were admitted.
De Funis, whose score was 76.23, was rejected. He sued, alleging a violation of the equal-protection clause. The state trial court ruled in his favor and ordered his admission, so that he did enter the law school in September 1971. The University appealed and won in the state's highest court. De Funis then took his case to the Supreme Court. Be cause he had been admitted, and was in his last quarter by the time the Court heard oral argument (he ranked, incidentally, about the middle of his class),s the Court dismissed the case as moot.
That action effectively postponed for four years a decision on the merits. Meanwhile, Allan Bakke, a thirty-three-year-old white engi neer who had been rejected by several medical schools despite excel lent grades, test scores, and recommendations, brought suit against the University of California. The medical school at Davis had reserved sixteen of the one hundred places in its entering class for blacks, American Indians, Chicanos, and Asian-Americans. This policy was not only reverse discrimination, but, to use a word that bore even worse connotations, a quota. The year Bakke was rejected, minority students who ranked below him were admitted. Bakke challenged his exclusion under both the equal-protection clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids racial discrimination in any program receiving federal funds.
He won his case, by a vote of 5 to 4. Of the majority, four justices Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens-based their votes on Title VI, while Justice Powell insisted that both this law and the equal protection clause forbade a racial classification of this nature. Powell argued, however, that while reserving a specific number of seats for minority applicants was illegal, the university could take race into account in a less specific way. White, Blackmun, Brennan, and Mar shall joined him on this point. They dissented from the ruling against the Davis scheme, arguing that neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor Title VI forbade it.6 Obviously, the issue had not yet been resolved. Court ruled that a federal public works program that reserved 10 per cent of spending for minority-owned businesses was within Congress' enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Burger, writing for a plurality of three, relied heavily on congressional findings of past discrimination. Powell joined this opinion, but wrote a concurrence distinguishing Fullilove from Bakke on just this basis.
Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall restated their views on the general acceptability of reverse discrimination. Stewart-who appeared to be moving away from reverse discrimination as steadily as Powell was moving toward it-wrote a dissent that strongly rejected all racial discrimination, invidious or benign. Stevens and Rehnquist also dis sented.
Here, at some risk, is the prevailing doctrine on reverse discrimi nation. The Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to en act reverse discrimination plans, including quotas, at least when prior disadvantage and direct discrimination exist. For at least one justice, the same amendment forbids state agencies to establish quotas, but permits them to consider race in some nebulous way. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, whose language forbids employment dis crimination based on race, does in fact allow employers and unions to discriminate in favor of blacks, even by setting quotas. But Title VI, whose language prohibits racial discrimination in programs receiving federal money, does prevent such programs from setting racial quotas. Out of all this legislative and judicial language emerges only one firm constitutional rule: Congress may establish reverse discrimination programs when evidence of prior discrimination and disadvantage ex ists. Whether any other government-imposed reverse discrimination is acceptable, and under what circumstances, is unclear.
I am concerned here with the constitutionality of these policies, not with their wisdom or their desirability. Therefore, I confine myself to arguments that have some bearing on constitutional issues. I am ask ing whether reverse discrimination is compatible with the right to equal 'Ibid., , 219-5 5 (Rehnquist). 9100 S. Ct. 2758 Ct. (1980 . respect and concern, and whether it can satisfy the rigors of constitu tional reasoning.
Qualifications, Merit, and "the Right to Be Judged as an Individual"
There are several common arguments against such policies, which I discuss in what I think can be shown to be ascending order of impor tance. One objection is that reverse discrimination rewards the less qualified while depriving the more qualified. Allan Bakke's case pro duced many versions of this argument. As a constitutional principle, however, the point is weak.
There exists at present no constitutional right to be judged accord ing to one's "qualifications." But is there a basis for recognizing such a right? It could be argued that the fundamental right to equal respect and concern entails the derivative right to be rewarded according to merit. I agree that there are certain narrowly defined situations, such as that in McDonald, in which such a right exists. But, in general, no such relationship between treatment as an equal and merit holds.
Why not? We ll, why? Are we comfortable with the idea that merit should be the only, or the principal, basis for the distribution of ben efits? What about need, for instance ? Besides, what does "merit" mean? One reason that it is difficult to accept such a claim is that some of the terms used have confused and arbitrary meanings. What does it mean to say that a person merits, deserves, or has earned the privilege of going to medical school or being hired ? Do any standards exist, other than those chosen by the decision makers ?
The term "qualifications" has similar difficulties; there is an absence of agreement as to what qualifications are.lO To the extent that agree ment exists about qualifications for medical school, for example grade point average, score on the Medical College Admission Te st, and recommendations-this agreement is the product of arbitrary de cisions to weigh these factors heavily, decisions made long ago with out much thought and accepted ever since. It would be bold and fool hardy to interpret the Constitution as enacting such fragile constructs.
A related argument that may appear to have more substance is that an applicant should be judged "as an individual" and not as a member of a group.ll This has become a popular argument, but on analysis it turns out to have defects. Kenneth Karst and Harold Horowitz have pointed out that "any equal protection claim turns out to be a claim made as a member of a group. Indeed, any claim based on a rule of law is a demand to be treated in the same manner as all other persons similarly situated. A claim to be treated on the basis of one's 'individ ual attributes' either is a disguised claim to be treated as a member of a group possessed of one or more specific attributes or it is unintelli gible." Dworkin has suggested that any judgment must rely on gener alizations about groups. For example, establishing a GPA cutoff point, as the University of Wa shington did, treats both those above and those below as members of a group who share that attribute.
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Any standard, by definition, classifies those judged by it. It is wrong to suggest that I am treated "as an individual" if I am judged on the basis of my teaching evaluations or the number of my publications, but "as a member of a group" if I am judged by race or sex. In fact, what a demand to be treated as an individual often means is simply a demand to be treated as the privileged group has been treated; within that group, judgments may or may not have been made on merit or qualifications, however defined.
This argument is often confused with the "qualifications" argu ment. Grades and test scores are described as "individual" attributes because they are earned by an individual; they are acquired character istics, as opposed to ascribed and permanent characteristics, such as race and sex. Earned attributes do have a relationship to individual merit that race and sex do not have, but it is hard to see how they are more related to individuality. A grade point average belongs to an individual; we say, "She pulled a 4.0 last semester." But we also say, "She's black." Race and sex belong to individuals, too.
The fact that these arguments, with their defects, are frequently made-and with vehemence, particularly in conversation-indicates that this issue has touched some very sensitive nerves. But the objec tions to reverse discrimination do not rely only on such arguments as these. The crucial point has often been that it is race that is the basis for choice. And such a policy bears a heavy burden of justification. It faces a ready-made, and powerful, counterargument. 
Race Discrimination: Principle or Interest?
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at least a generation: dis crimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told that this is not a matter of fundamental principle, but only a matter of whose ox is gored. Those for whom racial equality was demanded are to be more equal than others. Having found support in the Constitution for equality, they now claim support for ine quality under the same Constitution.
The foregoing paragraph is a passage from Alexander M. Bickel's last and posthumously published book, The Morality of Consent. 13 It has been cited in at least three Supreme Court opinions.14 With char acteristic clarity and eloquence, Professor Bickel has made a powerful case against reverse discrimination. The argument is a strong one, for it accuses the proponents of hypocrisy and of self-serving deviation from the "neutral principles" sought in constitutional adjudication. That racial or sexual or ethnic discrimination is wrong constitutes what Herbert We chsler would call "grounds of adequate neutrality and generality ... transcending the immediate result that is achieved" in any given case. IS That racial or sexual or ethnic discrimination is wrong when it favors certain groups but right when it favors other groups appears to be the very opposite of such a principle.
But this appearance is deceptive. However appealing Bickel's state ment is, it is wrong. First, the great decisions of the I950S and I960s did not depend on the principle that race discrimination is unconsti tutional, although some of them did articulate it. Second, the last sen tence of the last paragraph does not articulate the principle on which reverse discrimination depends. The distinction between invidious and benign discrimination-or, to phrase it differently, between traditional and reverse discrimination-is not simply a matter of whose ox is being gored .. The argument for any given program may be made that way, but that, after all, is how political demands are made. The dis tinction is a principled one, transcending any immediate result.
The charge of partiality is not the only substantial argument against reverse discrimination. In Chapter 5 I suggested that using race, sex, or ethnicity as a way of assigning burdens or benefits seems unfair on its face, because of the involuntary, immutable, and irrelevant nature of these traits, whatever race or sex a person happens to be. This is one reason the neutral suspect-classification rule of McLaughlin, Lov ing, and Frontiero has been so popular-and, I think, underlies Bick el's conclusion about the "lesson of contemporary history."
So the task I have set myself is to argue both that reverse discrimi nation is principled, and that law may deprive some people, but not others, because of race or sex. This argument confronts certain ob stacles, but I think Chapter 4 indicates that the Fourteenth Amend ment's legislative history is not paramount among them. In the two miscegenation cases of the 1960s, the Court found in that provision an intent to condemn all racial discrimination, but, in fact, speakers in Congress defended that very kind of law with an argument that contradicts that conclusion. Furthermore, the debates reveal overrid ing concern with the status of one racial group. Indeed, one scholar has suggested that the principles of the Civil Wa r Amendments were not neutral at all; that the goal was to ensure full equality fo r blacks;
and, implicitly at least, there was nothing wrong with that goal.16 That interpretation, of course, would demand the results reached in Mc Laughlin and Loving as well as in the school segregation cases, but the neutral ban on discrimination does not emerge from the history. The historical evidence is permissive, neither condemning reverse dis crimination nor demanding it. Resolution of the issue will have to depend on some other basis.
What is it about race that makes it seem an unfair basis for discrim ination ? I have devoted some space to this line of argument, but we can put it into sharper focus by considering the viewpoint of the per sons affected by such policies. Someone in the position of Marco De Funis, Allan Bakke, or Brian We ber has been denied training that would greatly improve his prospects. Although it would be incorrect to state that this person has been denied benefits because of his race, it is true that his chances have been reduced because of his race. Being white hurt him. And he is no more responsible for being white than others are for being black, Hispanic, or American Indian. Nor does his race have any relationship to his ability to succeed in a training program or a professional school. It is possible to argue that race may have some relationship to a person's value as a doctor or lawyer, if one accepts certain arguments for reverse discrimination, but after all, suc cess in medical or law school is a necessary precondition to becoming a doctor or lawyer. So the case for this applicant has a strong emo tional and rational appeal.
But it contains some dissonances. Being white was a disadvantage to De Funis, Bakke, and We ber in one limited instance, but it is hardly a disadvantage in general. On the contrary, any white person alive in this country today has reaped unearned rewards because of race, and a white person's claim to immunity to racially based deprivations must be judged with that fact in mind. Of course, a person cannot help being white, but who would regret it?
That point leads to the paramount difference between invidious and benign discrimination. Other writers, such as Dworkin and Richard Wa sserstrom, have made this argument before, but it needs to be de veloped here. Dworkin insists that the rejected white applicant has no right here "because in his case race is not distinguished by the special character of public insult. On the contrary, the program presupposes that his race is still widely if wrongly thought to be superior to oth ers." Wa sserstrom put it this way: "In our culture to be nonwhite and especially to be black-is to be treated and seen to be as members of a group that is different from and inferior to the group of standard, fully developed persons, the adult white males." Therefore, "it is wrong to think that contemporary affirmative action programs are racist or sexist in the centrally important sense in which many past and present features of our society have been racist or sexist." 17
The distinction between discrimination against blacks and discrim ination against whites is that the former is part of a system that stig matizes the group and treats its members as inferiors, and the latter is not. This character of public insult is what denies the right to treat ment as an equal, and it provides a principle for decision that satisfies the requirements of neutrality. It does no violence to the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. And it could have provided a principled basis for the decisions of the 1950S and 1960s which instead articu lated the notion that any and all racial discrimination was unconsti tutional.
Standards and Subjectives
But the argument cannot stop here. To be a guide to interpretation, a rule must be intelligible and contain objective, reliable criteria for decision making. In his Bakke opinion, Justice Powell criticized the efforts of Justice Brennan and of Judge Mathew To briner of the Cali fornia Supreme Court to develop such a rule as the one toward which I have been working. Brennan distinguished between "racial classifi cations that stigmatize-because they are drawn on the presumption that one race is inferior to another or because they put the weight of the government behind racial hatred and separatism"-and policies "designed to enable [members of disadvantaged groups] to surmount the obstacles imposed by racial discrimination." To briner emphasized the familiar notion of "discrete and insular minorities" who might get special solicitude from government.
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It was not the policies these distinctions permit that apparently most troubled Justice Powell. It was rather that he found the concepts of "stigma" and "minority" essentially without meaning. He dealt with "stigma" in a footnote, dismissing it as having "no clearly defined constitutional meaning" and "reflect[ing] a subjective judgment that is standardless." He paid more attention to the differences between "majority" and "minority." These concepts necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and political judgments .... The white "majority" itself is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the state and private individuals. Not all of these groups can receive preferential treatment and corresponding judicial tolerance of distinc tions drawn in terms of race and nationality, for then the only "major ity" left would be a new minority of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. There is no principled basis for deciding which groups would merit heightened judicial solicitude and which would not. 19
Is Powell right in concluding that no intelligible distinction between advantaged and disadvantaged groups is possible? That "stigma" has no clear constitutional meaning is true, but not particularly signifi cant; neither, after all, did such concepts as "suspect classification" and "clear and present danger" when they first appeared. The way they acquired meaning was through use in a series of cases, and there is nothing to prevent "stigma" from getting similar use. Still, Powell has done us a favor by reminding us that before the concept can be used as a basis for decisions, it is necessary to think about what the term means and about how to recognize the reality that the term de scribes. This necessity poses a problem, but it is exactly the opposite of the one that disturbs Powell: there are not too few standards for judgment, but too many. "Stigma" has a dictionary definition: "a brand ... a mark of in famy or disgrace ... any mark or label designed to indicate deviation from some norm or standard." This language recalls that of Strau der-"practically a brand upon them"-and a phrase from the Civil Rights Cases-" badges of slavery." 2o "Stigma" is also the title of a well-known book whose sociologist author defines the term as "an attribute which is deeply discrediting." 21 We know which races this definition applies to ; more important, there exist indicators of what we know.
If a stigma is a mark or brand, what constitutes a stigma ? One of the best discussions of this issue comes from Richard Wa sserstrom:
We know, for instance, that it is wrong, clearly racist, to have racially segregated bathrooms .... How is this to be accounted for ? The answer ... can be discovered through a consideration of the role that this prac tice played in that system of racial segregation we had in the United States-from, in other words, an examination of the social realities. For racially segregated bathrooms were an important part of that system. And that system had an ideology .... A significant factor of that ideol ogy was that blacks were not only less than fully developed humans; they were also dirty and impure. They were the sort of persons who could and would contaminate white persons if they came into certain kinds of contact with them .... This ideology was intimately related to a set of institutional arrangements and power relationships in which whites were politically, economically, and socially dominant. The ideology sup ported the institutional arrangements, and the institutional arrange ments reinforced the ideology. The net effect was that racially segregated bathrooms were both a part of the institutional mechanism of oppres sion and an instantiation of this ideology of racial taint. The point of maintaining racially segregated bathrooms was not in any simple or di rect sense to keep both whites and blacks from using each other's bath rooms; it was to make sure that blacks would not contaminate bath rooms used by whites.22
In a defense of the Brown decision, Charles L. Black, Jr., described segregation as "a picture of one in-group enjoying full normal com munal life and one out-group that is barred from this life and forced into a life of its own." 23 Black pointed out that in the town of Leeville, for example, the white high school was always Leeville High, while S. 409, 439, 440 (1968) .
the black school bore some other name. Hernandez v. Te xas, a case decided just two weeks before Brown, gave still more guidelines, and suggested that there can be more than one out-group within a com munity. This decision, which reaffirmed the principle that the equal protection clause protected ethnic groups other than blacks, men tioned segregation of public facilities, the extent of participation of a group in community life, and community attitudes as indicators of disadvantage.24 It is easy to think of similar indicators, such as in come, occupational distribution, and representation in public office.
Feminist literature provides another fruitful source of indicators of stigma and disadvantage. Black's dichotomy of in-group and out-group recalls Simone de Beauvoir's statement that "humanity is male and man defines women not in herself but as relative to him .... He is the Subject, he is the Absolute-she is the Other." 25 Black's high school illustration sounds rather like the "Mr. and Mrs. John Jones" conven tion. Scholarly comparisons of race and sex discrimination have di rected attention to shared features that may be more subtle. Helen Mayer Hacker's famed article in which she identified high visibility, ascribed attitudes, rationalizations of status, and attitudes of accom modation as characteristics of both blacks and women is one ex ample.26 "Stigma," then, does provide a potentially usable and useful stan dard. If anything, the concept does too much rather than too little.
But what about "minority" ? There is something disturbing about re lying too heavily on this concept; Judge To briner, in particular, did not seem to realize that a minority can oppress a majority. But that was not Justice Powell's objection. His two arguments support one another. Had he been more receptive to the concept of stigma, he might have seen ways to distinguish between those groups that qualify for reverse discrimination and those that do not. But even without that help, his argument about the difficulties of distinguishing between mi nority and majority does not apply to racial groups. They are easy to identify. A final objection to Powell's argument is that nothing in the Constitution prevents the government from deciding to establish re verse discrimination for some disadvantaged groups but not for oth ers. To permit reverse discrimination does not require that it be ex- tended to all groups that may qualify for it. If anyone were arguing that the Constitution required reverse discrimination, Powell's objec tion would be a forceful one, but the operative verb is not "require" but "permit." Reverse discrimination is not a right.
To speak of stigmatization and public insult-or, if one prefers, of discreteness and insularity-can therefore provide manageable stan dards for adjudication. The objective criteria are there. The distinction between in-group and out-group, between empowered and disempow ered, need not become bogged down in conceptual difficulties.
But a third question remains. Even if we can distinguish among groups, can we distinguish between invidious and benign policies? This question is particularly troubling and inescapable for the specialist in sex discrimination, who knows all too well that laws intended to be benign can in fact be harmful. Is it not possible that, as even Justice Brennan warned, "programs designed ostensibly to ameliorate the ef fects of past racial discrimination ... may ... reinforce the views of those who believe that members of racial minorities are inherently incapable of succeeding on their own"?27 This question echoes a com mon argument against reverse discrimination, which suggests that it is in fact stigmatizing because it carries a presumption that its benefi ciaries have been rewarded on some basis other than their compe tence.28 But for minorities the choice is not between favored treatment and succeeding on one's own; it is often between favored treatment and exclusion. Besides, it is difficult to see how getting a job will create a permanent presumption of inferiority, since, after all, one still has a chance to prove oneself. It is of course true that compensations can become concessions-this is not a trivial problem-but the last dec ade of sex discrimination cases shows th at, although the Court has sometimes had trouble making those distinctions, they can be made.
These cases indicate that reverse discrimination not only can be based on stigmatizing stereotypes, but may have, singly or in combination, any of three effects. First, it may actually compensate for prejudice and oppression. Second, it may harm rather than help the group it reaches. Or third, it may do virtually nothing. Brennan's distinction between laws that stigmatize and laws that compensate is too either orish, for there is the third possibility. This group of decisions shows that the old stereotypes are still alive, and contains examples of all three possible effects. 
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When the sex discrimination cases are grouped logially rather than chronologically, definite patterns emerge. Tw o social security cases, We inberger v. Wiesenfeld in 1975 and Califano v. Goldfarb in 1977, invalidated supposed benefits that in fact were burdensY Each in volved discriminations between widows and widowers. Stephen Wie senfeld, whose wife died in childbirth, sued to challenge a rule that entitled only widows with minor children to benefits based on a dead spouse's earnings. Leon Goldfarb, a retired man whose wife had worked for many years before her death, was denied benefits under a regula tion that restricted them to widowers whose wives had provided at least half their support.
Both regulations appeared to be, and were defended as, discrimi nation in favor of dependent widows. They contained "a presumption that wives are usually dependent" and would be objectionable for that reason alone.30 But there was a graver problem, which the Court saw.
The law, it declared in Wiesenfeld, clearly operates ... to deprive women of protection for their families which men receive as a result of their employment. Indeed ... in this case social security taxes were deducted from Paula's salary during the years in which she worked. Thus, she not only failed to receive for her family the same protection which a similarly situated male worker would have received, but she also was deprived of a portion of her own earn ings in order to contribute to the fund out of which benefits would be paid to others.31
The same was true of Hannah Goldfarb. So these laws, like the old labor laws and possibly the draft exemption, turn out to be invidi ous-as well as stereotyping and patronizing. The lesson of Wiesen fe ld and Goldfarb is that each case demands, first of all, a determina tion whether the discrimination involved is benign or invidious.
Three cases involve laws that belong in the "discard" category. The first, Kahn v. Shevin, upheld Florida's $500 property tax exemption for widows, a provision that reduced an individual tax bill by about $ 15. If the length of the opinion, just over three pages, is any guide, the majority found the case a simple one. Citing government statistics on median earnings of male and female workers, the Court found the law "reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss im- poses a disproportionately heavy burden." 32 There are several prob lems with this reasoning,33 but two in particular are relevant here. First, it seems unlikely that this law, which was enacted in r885, had any such purpose; it is far more likely that it rested on generalizations about female dependence with which the judges who ruled on earlier laws were at home. Second, a $r 5 credit does not confer much of a benefit.
The next case was Schlesinger v. Ballard. Here the Court sustained a Navy regulation whose effect was to allow women officers four more years of service before mandatory discharge for want of promotion than male officers got (a provision that was dropped soon after this decision). The Court majority thought this rule, too, was a compen sation. Justice Stewart suggested that women officers might need more time than men to pile up comparable records, since they were ex cluded from combat and most sea duty. The dissenters' response to this argument was devastating. Justice Brennan showed that the reg ulation was part of a scheme that, far from compensating women of ficers, severely restricted their opportunities, and pointed out that male and female line officers do not compete for promotion.34 The benefits conferred on women by this law were as illusory as those in Florida's tax exemption.
Nearly two years passed between Ballard and the next similar de cision, Craig v. Boren, the 3.2 percent beer case. No one ever claimed a compensatory purpose for this discrimination; it is reverse discrim ination, however, since it does benefit the previously disadvantaged group. The Court found "an unduly tenuous 'fit' " between the state's interest in traffic safety and an association so limited and arbitrary as that between young manhood and drunk driving.35 The importance of Craig lies in the constitutional rule it pronounced on sex discrimina tion, which I discussed in Chapter 5. This rule reappears in Brennan's Bakke opinion as demanding "an important and articulated purpose" for reverse discrimination, whether racial or sexua1.36 My own analy sis of this group of cases convinces me that, at least as far as it goes, Brennan's conclusion is correct.
A test for reverse discrimination must distinguish between legiti mate and illegitimate policies and among compensation, concession, 32 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974) ; see Ruth Bader Ginsberg, "Gender and the Supreme Court," Supreme Court Review, 1975 , pp. 1, 4. 33 Baer, "Sexual Equality," p. 480. 34 419 U.S. 498, 508-9, 5II-17 (1975 . 35 429 U. S. 190, 202 (1976) . 36 438 U.S. 265, 361. and trivia. Like most rules, this one works best in the situation in which it originated: a case such as Craig, where only the most dubious relation existed between the law at issue and any objective. Kahn and Ballard are similar cases, and in each the rule would dictate the op posite result. The Craig rule was actually applied in two important reverse sex discrimination cases. These are more difficult cases than any of the preceding ones; the laws not only granted tangible benefits, but had a clear connection to serious governmental purposes. These cases show that, while the Craig rule is not self-applying, the inevi table problems can be solved. The rule does permit the crucial distinc tions.
A I979 case, Orr v. Orr, overturned Alabama's sex-specific ali mony law. Its roots in sexist stereotypes-"the state's preference for an allocation of family responsibilities in which the wife plays a de pendent role" 37 -are obvious, but the relationship of these roots to the law itself is not altogether clear. At this point we need to consider both the importance of the law's end and the relationship between ends and means.
To require an "important" purpose is a more stringent rule than to demand a "legitimate" one, but for an end to be important it must at least be legitimate. The alimony law appears on its face to be designed to protect needy ex-wives. Indeed, the Alabama court insisted that the law was enacted for "the wife of a broken marriage who needs finan cial assistance." 38 This end is inseparable from an assumption of fe male dependence and financial inadequacy. This notion arises from and reinforces society's pattern of sexual stigmatization by which sex becomes a proxy for inferiority. Such legislation, as Brennan cogently argued in Bakke and Frontiero, is inherently illegitimate. This point becomes clearer if we imagine a law that provided some similar kind of benefit, upon individual qualification, only to blacks. Although blacks are indeed more likely than whites to be poor, the assumption that only blacks, and any black, may be incapable of self-support is pat ently racist.
Suppose, however, that Alabama's purpose was not to protect wives (despite what the state's own court said), but to protect spouses, and that, to paraphrase Goldfarb, the state coupled with this aim a pre sumption of wifely dependence. Justice Brennan apparently thought this was the true situation: "a legislative purpose to provide help for needy spouses, using sex as a proxy for need." If so, the ends are sex-neutral-and concededly valid-but the means are sex-specific. The same sexist presumptions may exist as before, but at this point the usual secondary justification for these laws, administrative conve nience, has to be considered. Even this interpretation has not ex hausted the possibilites. Alternatively, the law might compensate "women for past discrimination during marriage, which assertedly has left them unprepared to fend for themselves in the working world following divorce." 39 This is a sex-specific end, but, despite patroniz ing undertones, it too closely resembles benign discrimination to be casually dismissed as a sexist one.
The Court found it unnecessary to resolve either of these issues. The opinion found no valid reason for using sex as a proxy for either need or disadvantage. Since an individual hearing was always required be fore a judge could award alimony, such wives could be helped even with a sex-neutral policy, with little additional burden on the state. Thus even the problem of administrative convenience is illusory.
In an academic context, the compensation argument deserves more consideration than the Court gave it. A good analogy here is Ballard.
Preference for women in regard to military tenure turned out to be part of a pattern of negative discrimination rather than true compen sation. (If a third analogy is forgivable, it was rather as if universities gave female junior faculty members extra probationary time while si multaneously imposing heavier teaching loads on them or a ceiling on their publications.) Some of the "discrimination during marriage" of which Justice Brennan spoke consists of legally imposed or ratified restrictions on wives, such as domiciliary dependence and domestic duties. The law of marriage and divorce is notoriously sexist and tra ditional; it is highly unlikely that alimony was ever designed as a form of compensation.
Even though Orr v. Orr itself did not demand resolution of some of these problems, future cases probably will, and this discussion shows the usefulness of the Craig rule. It does suggest, however, an amend ment that may be necessary: not only must a law meet the test of substantial relation to important purpose, but the purpose must be one that cannot be fulfilled by sex-neutral or race-neutral means. Thus the alimony law, like Florida's tax exemption, would fall because its legitimate ends can be achieved by neutrally written laws.
Of the relevant cases, only Califano v. We bster remains. This is the only case that involves true benign discrimination. We bster involved a rule whereby old-age insurance benefits depend on a worker's average 3' 99 S.Cr. II02, III2. monthly wage earned during the years (reduced by five) during which wages were highest. Until 1972, when the scheme was equalized, a woman worker could exclude three more lower earning years from her average than a man could. In a per curiam opinion in 1977, the Court applied the three-month-old Craig rule to sustain the defunct provision. Far from being a product of obsolete generalizations about ability or dependence, the scheme "operated directly to compensate women for past economic disadvantage." 40 The provision was not designed to alleviate poverty, using sex as a proxy for poverty. Its purpose was rather to rectify a certain kind of economic disadvantage: sex discrimination in earnings. Sex was not a proxy for anything. Ample evidence exists of the disparity between men's and women's earnings; this disparity transcends class, race, oc cupation, education, and all other relevant factors. Virtually all women (whether deliberately or not) have been underpaid because they are women. The importance of the law's purpose is demonstrable, and by its nature that purpose can be achieved only by sex-specific means. The only way to compensate for sex discrimination is to provide ben efits on the same basis.
We bster supplies a good analogy to Bakke. Race has limited edu cational opportunities as surely as gender has restricted earnings. These disadvantages have persisted for a long time; even if proof is lacking that they have been imposed willfully, they have been imposed. Each policy helped make up for the past inequalities, and afforded real, not illusory, benefits to the groups involved. If the social security provision is constitutional, there is every good reason why preferential admis sions should be.
These cases have vindicated the fears Justice Brennan expressed in
Bakke. To o ready acceptance of reverse discrimination would be dan gerous. Even recent laws can reinforce negative stereotypes, hurt rather than help, be part of a system of rules that is in fact invidious, or be so trivial as to verge on banality. Reverse racial discrimination may present fewer opportunities than sex discrimination for this type of legislation, given prevailing climates of opinion, but if we treat race and sex discrimination with equal seriousness, we must develop rules that avoid these dangers as far as possible. Consistently with the history and spirit of the Fourteenth Amend ment, we can generalize from race and sex to other attributes. To con sign people to an inferior position in society, to disempower them, to insult and stigmatize them is to deny them the right to treatment as 40430 U.S. 313, 3 18 (1977) it is helpful to think about why this situation is so disturbing. In such a case, several workers have committed an act for which each is re sponsible; all exercised individual choice, and all were guilty of wrongdoing. This is not, therefore, a typical case of race discrimina tion. It is not unlike Senator Howard's example of the black man who is hanged for a crime for which a white man is not hanged. Individual responsibility, which is exactly what is absent from most cases of race discrimination, was present, and was discounted.
In McDonald, two workers were punished and a third was not.
That decision, in itself, is not necessarily wrong. When several people commit the same offense, they are often punished differently. Va rious reasons may be offered, including such factors as exculpatory circum stances and prior records. But all these factors relate to individual responsibility, motive, or intent. Punishment for wrongdoing is a dis tinct kind of policy; rather like course grading, it depends on individ ual responsibility in ways that other decisions do not. The nexus be tween wrongdoing and punishment is tighter than that between test scores and medical school. Punishment depends on a person's behav-41 438 U.S. 265, 358. 42 Ibid., p. 361. See 429 U.S. 190 (1976) .
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ior in a specific situation, governed by specific rules known to both the punished and the punisher. It is a special case.
There are other situations in which reverse discrimination would be disturbing. A thread that runs through discussions of this issue is the fear expressed by Justice Brennan in Bakke that these programs may reinforce racist notions. We have seen some examples of allegedly preferential treatment for women which reinforce sexist notions, and it is possible to imagine racial analogies. Suppose, for example, that a law provided some sort of financial benefit, upon individual qualifi cation, only to blacks. It is true, of course, that blacks are more likely than whites to be poor. But an assumption that only blacks can be, and any black may be, incapable of self-support is dearly racist. It harms both those included in and those excluded from the benefits. This policy may sound fanciful as an example of race discrimination, but if we think of sex discrimination, it recalls Orr v. Orr. Such poli cies, whether designed for women or for racial minorities, are objec tionable because they use sex or race as a proxy for a factor such as need, which is not only poorly related to these attributes, but related to them in a patronizing and insulting way.
Such a law differs from classic reverse discrimination in yet another important respect. It excludes individuals entirely from a benefit on the basis of race or sex. The deprivation is absolute. It is as if a profes sional school reserved all of its places for minorities, not just sixteen out of a hundred, as Davis did. Suppose, just to make the hypothetical case more interesting, that this school is not one of several within a large urban area but one that is relatively isolated, as UC Davis is.
Since not everyone is free to move in order to go to medical school, such a policy could effectively prevent some people from attending at all. This is too severe a deprivation to be based on race or sex alone. (Howard, Meharry, and the Wo men's Medical College of Pennsylva nia would not be vulnerable to this objection, since in their prime they were not only limited to blacks or women but were in effect the only institutions open to them on an equal basis. None of them is now so limited.) The character and severity of the deprivation have to be con sidered.
In at least three situations, then, reverse discrimination would not be acceptable. Only the second, the "black alimony" case, can reason ably be said to involve any sort of stigmatization, to imply defects in those ostensibly favored. The other two cases could survive the Craig test of important and articulated purpose. But the harm they inflict on the majority is too great. To tal exclusion has something in common with McDonald. To punish differentially, or to bar people from edu-cation, training, or employment, does worse damage than to reduce their chances to compete for limited resources.
The two-tier equal-protection model does recognize similar distinc tions of degree, but its rigid dichotomy between ordinary interests and "fundamental rights" will not help solve the problem. Getting into medical school is not a fundamental right, nor is escaping punishment when others escape it (although, if McDonald had involved criminal prosecution, that possibility could not easily be dismissed). This dis cussion recalls Justice Marshall's dissent in Rodriguez, where he re jected the two-tier model in favor of concentration on "the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classification." 43 Some hierarchy of interests and claims has to be built into equal-protection litigation.
Conclusion
There are principled bases for distinguishing between malign and benign discrimination; between the advantaged and disadvantaged; between acceptable and unacceptable deprivations. We need not be hypocrites in order to defend reverse discrimination. Such a defense can rest on distinctions stronger than my ox versus your ox. What constitutional arguments in favor of reverse discrimination force us to do is not to reject all principle but to reexamine the landmark cases of the last thirty years. The principle that some of them articulated that all racial discrimination is illegitimate-is not compatible with reverse discrimination. But this chapter and the last have shown that that principle was not necessary for those results.
The reverse discrimination cases, like the rulings examined in Chap ter 5, show how the Supreme Court has constricted the Constitution's guarantee of equality. The decisions focus not on the foundations of this guarantee but on the traits that are the bases for classification. A broad guarantee of equality is read as a proscription of race discrimi nation. This construction is both less and more than what the consti tutional language and history imply. As we have seen, Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment is not phrased in terms of race. There is no powerful reason to conclude that its scope is limited to race discrimi-43 4II U.S. 1, 99 (1973) . Emphasis supplied.
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Equality under the Constitution nation. Nor is there any powerful reason to read the Constitution as forbidding all racial discrimination, whomever it helped.
Supposedly "neutral" discriminations are indeed premised on no tions of inferiority. But discriminations ip favor of those groups that have been stigmatized, oppressed, and insulted are designed to bring these groups to full equality. Therefore, they are in accord with the Constitution, and there is no persuasive legal argument against them. They may not always be necessary ; specific plans, certainly, may be unwise; and they may not achieve their purpose. It is possible, as times and attitudes get harder, that we shall see fewer and fewer of them. But these considerations are not reasons to declare such discrimina tions unconstitutional, and thus to frustrate efforts to fulfill the prom ise of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The next three chapters represent a change in focus. Now I shall be concerned not with race and sex but with age, disability, and sexual orientation. The issue of age discrimination may be recent, but the fa ct is very old, and legal frameworks exist for dealing with it. In the last two areas the problems go beyond questions of discrimination. The handicapped and homosexuals are the targets of discrimination, but that is not all they are subjected to. Not only will I get further and further away from traditional legal categories, but my scope will widen beyond equal protection and the Fourteenth Amendment.
I shall still be concerned with cases, but in none of the next three chapters do I attempt a comprehensive overview of the relevant case law. Nor will I confine myself to cases. Because these are new de mands, some of the people who will figure prominently in the next chapters come from 60 Minutes and the New Yo rk Ti mes rather than United States Reports and the Federal Reporter. But here again I shall be concerned with what these issues can teach us about equality under the Constitution.
